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RECENT DECISIONS
The privilege of conducting horse races for stakes exists at common
law and though rendered illegal, except as specially authorized, a li-
cense to conduct horse racing does not create a privilege, but merely
removes the statutory bar to exercising that privilege.' 3 A license
is no more than "a permission to exercise a pre-existing right which
has been subject to regulation in the interest of the public welfare." 14
The granting of a license to promote the public good, in and of itself,
makes neither the purpose a public one nor the license a franchise.
Nor does it place the licensee under an obligation to the public by
making his enterprise a public one.15
Plaintiff had no common law right to enter the race track, since
the defendant had an absolute right of exclusion (except as noted
heretofore), nor did the legislature create a right of entry for the
plaintiff.' 6
The principal case follows the traditional New York view. Ws
to other jurisdictions, the common law rule is subject to the abro-
gating statutes which have been passed by the respective legislatures.
J.P.M.
CRIMINAL LAW-FAIR TRIAL-DUTY OF PROSECUTOR TO RE-
FRAIN FROM OvER-ZEALOUS ADvocAc.-The defendant makes an
application for a new trial after having been found guilty of murder
in the first degree and sentenced to death. His conviction was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. At a later date the sentence was
commuted by Governor Dewey to life imprisonment. Apparently,
the prosecuting attorney had been led to believe that the defendant
had been previously convicted of a number of other crimes. The
prejudicial effect of questioning the defendant on this mistaken in-
formation was not mitigated by the denials of the accused. Held,
motion for a new trial granted. People v. Fishgold, - Misc. -,
71 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (1947).
"The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done." ' Generally it is up
to the trial judge to decide to what extent the district attorney may
cross-examine a witness as to matters that may discredit him,2 but
13 Corrigan v. Coney Island Jockey Club, 2 Misc. 512, 22 N. Y. Supp. 394
(Sup. Ct 1893).14 Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 255, 72 N. E. 2d
697, 699 (1947)-
15 Cases cited note 2 supra.
16 N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAW § 40. This statute pertains only to discrimina-
tion based upon creed, color, race or national origin.
1 Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association, Canon V.2 Cf. Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N. Y. 347, 73 N. E. 2d 545 (1947);
La Beau v. The People, 34 N. Y. 223, 33 Hov. Pr. (N. Y. 1866).
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he may do so only on relevant facts. In a murder case the defendant
goes upon the stand at a distinct disadvantage, as a juror looks upon
his words with distrust and suspicion, for it is only natural for him
to give evidence favorable to himself.3  A jury need not take the
word of any witness as the truth 4 and in the case of such a defendant,
they are more inclined to disbelieve than to accredit. This puts the
prosecuting attorney at an advantage and it becomes his duty as a
"quasi-judicial officer," representing the people of the state, to act
impartially in the interest of justice and not merely as a partisan in
the action. It becomes his duty to see that the accused is not preju-
diced by incompetent evidence." This view is upheld in all American
jurisdictions.
The jury puts implicit faith in a district attorney; much more
so than in an attorney for a private litigant. They realize the facilities
for fact-finding at his disposal, and base their implicit faith upon
that premise. An unscrupulous public prosecutor might fortify a
weak case with the use of collateral questioning, merely implying and
not proving his points. He must remember that he has no duty to
secure a conviction. His duty is to seek justice and to that end he
should not ask incompetent questions for the purpose of prejudicing
the defendant in the jury's eyes.8 The Supreme Court of South
'Dakota recently 7 reiterated this universal doctrine and gave a new
trial to a defendant, as to whose guilt the court was satisfied,8 but
because the prosecuting attorney by asking irrelevant questions had
excited the passion of the jury and inflamed their prejudices against
the accused, a new trial had to be given.
The prosecutor, in a criminal case, must hold himself under
proper restraint and should never go beyond the evidence or the
bounds of reasonable moderation. He must at all times remember
that he represents the public interests and that this imposes upon
him the duty of exercising the restraint that goes with his high office.
Under no circumstance must he let any personal consideration tempt
him to procure a conviction at all hazards by vituperation of the de-
fendant. When the district attorney oversteps the line of moderation
required of him, it becomes the duty of the court to protect the
defendant in his fundamental right to a fair trial.'0
H. J. F.
3 The"People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288 (1879).
43 WGmOaE, EVMINCE § 981. (3d ed. 1940).
5 Taliaferro v. United States, 47 F. 2d 699 (C. C. A. 9th 1931); see The
People v. Nuzzo, 294 N.* Y. 227, 232, 62 N. E. 2d 47, 49 (1945) ; People v.
Carter, 327 Ill. 223, 158 N. E. 436 (1927).
6 State v. Haney, 222 Minn. 124, 23 N. W. 2d 369 (1946-) ; Todd v. State,
- Okla. Cr. -, 172 P. 2d 345 (1946); People v. Sheffield, 108 Cal. App. 721,
293 P. 72 (1930); People v. Carter, 327 Ill. 223, 158 N. W. 436 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa. 573, 139 Atl. 374 (1927).
7 State v. Thompson, - S. D. -, 24 N. W. 2d 10 (1946).
8 Ibid.
9 People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 53 N. E. 497 (1899).
20 A fair trial is a legal trial conducted in substantial conformity to law
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